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Abstract 
There is a bias towards believing information is true rather than false. The Spinozan 
account claims there is an early, automatic bias towards believing. Only afterwards can 
they engage in an effortful re-evaluation and disbelieve the information. Supporting this 
account, there is a greater bias towards believing information is true when under 
cognitive load. However, developing on the Adaptive Lie Detector (ALIED) theory, the 
informed Cartesian can equally explain this data. The account claims the bias under load 
is not evidence of automatic belief; rather, people are undecided, but if forced to guess 
they can rely on context information to make an informed judgment. The account predicts, 
and we found, that if people are not forced to guess when under load, but rather can 
explicitly indicate their uncertainty, there should be no bias towards believing because 
they are no longer required to guess. Thus we conclude that belief formation can be better 
explained by an informed Cartesian account. 
 
Keywords: Adaptive Lie Detector; Informed Cartesian; Lie detection; Spinozan mind; 
Truth bias; Uncertainty. 
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How do people decide what to assent belief in and what to dismiss as unbelievable? 
According to the ‘Spinozan’ account (Gilbert, Krull, & Malone, 1990), people have no 
choice but to first believe in everything, and then, only afterwards, can they decide 
whether or not to disbelieve it (Gilbert et al., 1990; see also Levine, 2014; for a weaker 
defaulting claim that is consistent with the Spinozan account). This account has been 
influential in a variety of research areas, from psycholinguistics to lie detection (see 
Gilbert, 1991; and Mandelbaum, 2014, for an overview). An alternative possibility, 
known as the ‘Cartesian’ account, proposes that there is no automatic need to first believe 
in something. Instead, people can hold information in mind without attaching any belief 
value to it, and then assess the credibility of that information as believable or not. Under 
this account, there is an initial period of uncertainty, rather than an initial automatic 
certainty of belief. Recently, there has been an informal debate in the literature with some 
citing evidence in favour and others citing evidence against the Spinozan account. This 
article aligns the apparently contradictory findings under a unified ‘informed Cartesian’ 
account. 
In their original set of experiments, Gilbert et al. (1990) showed participants videos 
of real or fake smiles. After each trial during this learning phase, participants were told 
explicitly whether the expression was honest or deceptive. On some trials, participants 
performed a concurrent task: To respond as quickly as possible to a tone (Study 1) or 
identify a clearly higher versus lower pitched tone (Study 2), both of which were 
sufficient to act as a cognitive load.  
The Spinozan view holds that when the facial expressions were first encountered, 
they were automatically believed to be truthful, and it was only during a second active 
and effortful stage that the credibility of that initial belief was assessed. Within this 
Spinozan framework, the following prediction was made. First, the researchers reasoned 
that an increase in cognitive load (arising from the concurrent probe tone task) would 
result in the effortful stage being bypassed, and as a result, judgements would reflect only 
the initial belief-assenting stage (Gilbert et al., 1990; Mandelbaum, 2014). Consistent 
with this prediction, the results revealed that during a subsequent test phase, when 
participants were given a true or false two-alternative forced-choice task, they were more 
likely to believe emotional expressions were genuine if they had to cope with a secondary 
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task during the learning phase (Gilbert, 1991; Gilbert et al., 1990; Mandelbaum, 2014; cf. 
Hasson, Simmons, & Todorov, 2005).  
Because the automatic belief stage must precede the more evaluative stage, the 
Spinozan account also predicts that the truth bias should appear early in the judgement 
process: Over time, the bias should decline because of a shift towards more evaluative 
processing (Gilbert, 1991; Gilbert, Tafarodi & Malone, 1993; Masip, Garrido & Herrero, 
2006; cf. Skurnik, Yoon, Park & Schwarz, 2005). The account relies heavily on reaction 
time data from psycholinguistic research (Mandelbaum, 2014). Indeed, Gilbert et al. 
(1990, Study 2; 1993, Study 3) have put this temporal prediction of theirs to the test. The 
data supported this prediction, with the truth bias being present when under time pressure, 
but waned without time pressure (Gilbert et al., 1993). They also found that forewarning 
participants of false information was not sufficient to prevent an initial truth belief 
(Gilbert et al., 1990). 
A recent study also put this temporal prediction to the test (Street & Richardson, 
2015a). They found a truth bias early in the decision process, as predicted by a Spinozan 
account. In their study, participants were forced to make a response at the onset of the 
stimulus and to continue updating their button response over time, depending on whether 
they changed their mind. This gave a temporal profile of the decision process. On the 
basis of the Spinozan account, the authors predicted a truth bias to be observed early in 
the judgement, resulting from an automatic and early belief. As predicted, a truth bias 
was observed during the initial moments of decision-making. But they also found that 
this early truth bias disappeared when participants were provided with the additional 
option to respond that they were ‘unsure’ about the credibility of the information. The 
Spinozan prediction was that the inclusion of this third option would be irrelevant; that is 
because is an automatic and necessary early bias towards believing. Street and 
Richardson proposed that an ‘informed Cartesian’ account readily explains this new 
finding, and the previous data as well. Specifically, the informed Cartesian view is that 
people make use of context information (e.g., ‘people usually tell the truth’; see DePaulo, 
Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996; Grice, 1975; McNally & Jackson, 2013) to 
make the best guess. ‘Context’ refers to information that pertains to this situation in 
general, giving an indication of whether most people will lie or tell the truth. When 
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participants are unsure but are required to make a response – ‘True or False’ – that 
context information is expressed as a truth bias. Accordingly, when a third ‘Unsure’ 
response option is provided, there is no longer a need to make an informed guess – 
people can instead indicate their uncertainty. The ‘True’ response shifts to ‘Unsure’ and 
with that, the early truth bias disappears. In other words, what had appeared to be an 
automatic early bias to believe everything is true (the Spinozan account) is revealed to be 
a context-driven best guess (the informed Cartesian account). The informed Cartesian 
account is consonant with the Adaptive Lie Detector (ALIED) theory (Street, 2015), 
which proposes that the bias towards believing results from an attempt to make a context-
informed guess when uncertain. 
The informed Cartesian account proposes that interrupting the encoding process 
during learning (e.g., by having participants respond to a noise while simultaneously 
learning whether information is true or false) takes resources or attention away from the 
learning task and causes uncertainty. This account adopts a boundedly rational approach 
(Simon, 1990). A boundedly rational agent is one who makes satisfactorily accurate 
responses with limited information and limited cognitive resources. Under uncertainty, 
people use heuristics (e.g., ‘rules of thumb’) to make sense of the world (Gigerenzer, 
Todd, & The ABC Research Team, 1999). For instance, when people are lacking 
information about a particular individual, they rely on more generalized stereotypic 
knowledge to make an informed impression of the person (Lick & Johnson, 2014). In the 
case of lie detection, one may rely on a more generalized understanding of how likely 
people are to lie in a given context, and use that to inform a judgement when one is 
unsure about whether any given person is lying (see Street, 2015, for a review). Because 
most people tell the truth most of the time (DePaulo et al., 1996), using this generalized 
heuristic will lead to a bias towards believing people are telling the truth. Put simply, if 
participants are unsure about something but are forced to guess, the informed Cartesian 
claims that they do not flip a mental coin – rather, they rely on their understanding of the 
context to make their guess. 
From this it also follows that it need not always be the case that people will expect 
others to be telling the truth, but that the expectation will vary with the context. For 
instance, police officers tend to be biased towards judging suspects’ statements to be lies 
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(Meissner & Kassin, 2002). The informed Cartesian account readily explains this as a 
context-dependent heuristic: A belief that suspects in general tend to lie (Moston, 
Stephenson, & Williamson, 1992). Note that while the effect of context is irrelevant to 
the Spinozan account, it is foundational to an informed Cartesian account. Decisions are 
derived from prior experience, knowledge, and an understanding of the current situation 
(Deutsch, Kordts-Freudinger, Gawronski, & Strack, 2009; Hasson et al., 2005; Richter, 
Schroeder, & Wöhrmann, 2009; Schroeder, Richter, & Hoever, 2008). This point is 
supported by the finding that if one changes the context so that raters believe most people 
will lie, there is an early bias towards disbelieving the speaker (i.e., a change in bias; 
Mayo, Schul, & Burnstein, 2004; Richter et al., 2009; Street & Richardson, 2015b; see 
also Levine, Kim, & Blair, 2010; Sperber et al., 2010). According to the Spinozan 
framework, this type of systematic movement in the judgement should not occur – 
initially people should always be biased to believe, regardless of context. According to 
the informed Cartesian account, there will only be an initial bias to believe when the 
context suggests that most people will tell the truth and they are then forced to make a 
decision, as shown by Street and Richardson (2015a, b). 
One might, however, seek to account for these new data by modifying the Spinozan 
position, and arguing that in all the above situations participants were not under a dual-
task cognitive load. A variant of the Spinozan position might propose that the Spinozan 
account predicts that only cognitive load sufficiently taxes the conscious mind to allow 
unconscious processes to be seen, and that the account makes no time-based predictions.1 
The early stages of processing may have reflected the involvement of a more cognitive 
controlled second stage, and this tended to 'bleed' into the early moments of the decision.   
Now, strictly speaking, this bleeding should not happen according to the Spinozan 
account (Gilbert, 1991). The original account claims an automatic (in the sense of fast, 
unintentional, and uncontrollable; Mandelbaum, 2014) belief stage precedes an 
evaluation stage (Gilbert et al., 1990, 1993; Skurnik et al., 2005; see also Unkelbach, 
2007). Gilbert (1991) notes that the evaluative and automatic belief stages are modular 
and so are strictly independent. Nonetheless, the most straightforward and scientific way 
                                                
1 We are unaware of any published claim of this sort. However, an anonymous 
reviewer of a previous manuscript suggested just such a modified Spinozan account. 
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to test this bleeding Spinozan account would be to simply put it to the test and give it 
every chance to succeed. Thus, the present study was adapted from the method employed 
by Gilbert et al. (1990, Study 2). In their study, they created a cognitive load on some 
trials by having participants perform a dual task. They found that people were biased 
towards believing when there was a cognitive load, which they took as supporting the 
Spinozan account. We used this same method here. Importantly, we added a between-
subjects manipulation. Participants were either given a two-alternative forced lie-truth 
choice or were given an additional response option of saying they were unsure.  
In line with Street and Richardson (2015a), we predicted that there would be a bias 
towards believing statements are true on interrupted items and when forced to make a 
judgement because they would rely on context-relevant information to help make the best 
guess when unsure. But when able to indicate their uncertainty, and no longer have to 
make the guess, we predicted no truth bias would be observed. Critically, if the original 
or modified Spinozan account is correct, the uncertainty response option should only 
eliminate the truth bias when participants are given the cognitive load task. When they 
are under a cognitive load, the evaluation stage is bypassed, and therefore, people must 
hold a truth belief. As a result, the presence of a third uncertainty response option will be 
irrelevant and the truth bias will be observed. Following Street and Richardson (2015a), 
the unsure responses are removed from analysis because we are interested in whether 
people made more truth than lie judgements, regardless of their unsure responses. 
Methods 
Participants 
Eighty-two undergraduate students (60 female) were recruited from a Canadian 
university (Mage = 21.35, SD = 3.92, range 17-44 years) and were paid $5. 
Materials 
We used the Bloomsbury Deception Set (Street et al., 2011) where each speaker 
delivered one honest and one deceptive statement about people they had supposedly met 
on holiday, under the guise that the researchers were filming for a documentary. The two 
statements from each speaker were organized into two separate stimulus sets so that each 
speaker either told the truth or lied in each stimulus set. There were 10 lies and 10 truths 
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in each set, and each participant only viewed one set. Full details of the stimuli can be 
found in Street and Richardson (2015b). The stimuli are available by request. 
Only the first 8 s of each clip was used in the current study, mirroring the 8-s 
presentation time of Gilbert et al. (1990). The audio was removed from each clip, leaving 
participants to judge deception from non-verbal behaviour alone. This is in keeping with 
the emotional expression experiment of Gilbert et al. (1990) where participants were 
shown a brief non-normed video of a smile without audio. The order of the clips was 
randomized once before the first run of the experiment and that order was maintained for 
every participant, following Gilbert et al.’s (1990) procedure. 
The videos were used during a training phase. In Gilbert et al.’s (1990) Study 2, 
participants were shown the same video a second time and asked to judge if the video 
was deceptive or honest. But because presenting the video a second time may lead to a 
re-evaluation of whether the speaker was telling the truth or not, to give the modified 
Spinozan account every chance to succeed, in the test phase we took still images from the 
video clip. Participants were told that they should use the image to recall back to the 
video and remember whether it was a truth or a lie. To further prevent the possibility that 
they would attempt to re-evaluate their judgements based on potential ‘tells’ to deception 
in the image (e.g., lack of eye contact), each video clip was reviewed manually and the 
still frame of the person found to be in as neutral a pose as could be found was used as 
the stimulus image in the test phase; for example, their arms were not gesticulating where 
possible and their face was relatively expressionless (Birmingham, Bischof, & Kingstone, 
2008, 2009). 
Procedure 
The procedure was adapted from Gilbert et al., (1990). During a learning phase, 
participants saw an 8-s clip of a speaker. Then, the word ‘Lie’ or ‘Truth’ was shown on 
screen for 3 s (referred to here as the feedback). There were a total of 20 trials, half of 
which were true and half false. On eight of the 20 trials there was a 500-Hz tone that 
sounded after 750 ms of the appearance of the feedback word, and lasted 390 ms2. 
                                                
2 The Spinozan account has never addressed the time scale at which belief 
formation occurs; only that it occurs automatically and rapidly. The timings used here 
were taken from Gilbert et al.’s (1990) studies supporting the Spinozan account. 
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Participants were instructed to hit the spacebar as quickly as possible when they heard the 
tone, ostensibly because we were interested in how the speed of response relates to 
memory (as in Gilbert et al., 1990; Study 1). In reality, the tone was intended to increase 
the cognitive load and interrupt processing of the feedback word. Note also that Gilbert et 
al. (1990) found this tone task was sufficient to engender a cognitive load. The first two 
and last two trials were never accompanied with a tone, and were not presented at the test 
phase to reduce primacy and recency effects. Of the remaining 16 trials, half of those 
were accompanied by the tone. They eight trials chosen to be accompanied by the tone 
were selected at random for each new participant. 
During a test phase, participants would have to identify whether each speaker had 
been lying or telling the truth. On each trial, a still image of a speaker was shown. 
Importantly, participants were instructed they should not attempt to detect deception from 
the image provided because the image had been taken from a different statement and so 
contained no useful information. They were told that the photograph was there just to 
indicate which speaker should be recalled. They had to think back to the video phase of 
the experiment and recall whether the feedback indicated if the person had lied or told the 
truth. 
Our experiment introduced a between-subjects manipulation into the original 
design. Half of our participants were randomly assigned to the lie-truth forced-choice 
condition (LT condition; n = 42): they were to judge whether the speaker lied or told the 
truth. The other half were assigned to the lie-truth-unsure unforced choice condition 
(LTU condition; n = 39): they could judge the speaker as having lied, told the truth, or 
respond that they were unsure if the speaker had lied or told the truth. 
Design 
The independent variables were the forced-choice response condition (LT or LTU, 
between participants), the veracity of the statement (truth or lie, within subjects), and the 
dual-task tone interruption, which served as the cognitive load manipulation (cognitive 
load or no load, within subjects). 
The number of truth judgements made out of all the lie-truth judgements was our 
dependent variable, which is referred to as the proportion of truth judgements (PTJ). Note 
that this calculation for the LTU condition discards all the unsure responses. This means 
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that a PTJ of 0.50 represents a lack of bias both the LT and LTU conditions, and values 
higher than this in both conditions indicate a bias towards making truth over lie 
judgements. 10% of responses were unsure responses. By ignoring the unsure responses, 
the two conditions could be directly compared. 
Results 
As expected by a Spinozan account, raters were truth-biased when judging items 
that were interrupted during learning, but not when judging uninterrupted items. This 
Spinozan effect was only found when raters made a forced binary lie-truth judgement. 
When they could indicate that they were unsure, interruption did not result in a greater 
proportion of truth to lie judgements. This invalidates the Spinozan account, and the 
modified Spinozan account. Our results are best accommodated by the informed 
Cartesian account, which predicts Spinozan-like biases under specific conditions (e.g., 
when the response options do not permit individuals to explicitly state their uncertainty), 
in which case they make the best guess when the context information is factored in. 
A 2 (response condition: LT or LTU, between subjects) x 2 (speaker veracity: lie or 
truth, within subjects) x 2 (cognitive load: load or no load during learning, within 
subjects) mixed ANOVA was conducted on the PTJ. The PTJ was calculated as the 
number of truth judgements divided by the total number of lie and truth judgements –
after removing the unsure responses. Thus in both the LT and LTU conditions, a 
proportion of 0.50 truth judgements represents a lack of bias and values greater than 0.50 
indicate a bias towards making truth judgements.  
There was a main effect of veracity, F(1, 79) = 55.07, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.41: People 
made more truth judgments when rating truthful (M = 0.64, SD = 0.21, 95% CI [0.60, 
0.69]) rather than deceptive statements (M = 0.37, SD = 0.22, [0.33, 0.42]). That is, 
people remembered who lied and told the truth above chance rates. 
Most critical to our hypothesis was that the LTU condition would not show an 
increased truth bias under cognitive load because they are not forced to guess when 
unsure.3 A response condition x cognitive load interaction confirmed this prediction, F(1, 
                                                
3 We should note that one might wish to suggest that because participants 
experienced half truthful and half deceptive items in the learning phase, they may have 
anticipated an equal base rate in the test phase also, which could have given rise to the 
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79) = 5.77, p = .019, ηp2 = 0.07. Bonferroni-corrected t-tests showed that raters in the LT 
condition were more likely to judge items as truthful when learning under cognitive load 
(M = 0.56, SD = 0.17, 95% CI [0.51, 0.61]) than when there was no load (M = 0.47, SD = 
0.19, [0.41, 0.53]), with a medium effect size: t(41) = 2.56, p = .011, d = 0.50. So when 
forced to judge, people appear Spinozan. But in the LTU condition, there was no 
evidence of significantly more truth judgements when there was no load (M = 0.48, SD 
= .17, [0.43, 0.54]) compared to when there was a cognitive load, (M = 0.51, SD = 0.19, 
[0.45, 0.57]), t(38) = -0.84, p = .404, d = -0.17, Figure 1.4 So when people are not forced 
to judge, they no longer look Spinozan. It would seem people appear Spinozan only when 
forced to judge. But when able to indicate their uncertainty people no longer show the 
biased responding. The analyses for all other main effects and interactions had a 
negligible effect size. They are not critical to the current hypotheses, but are reported in 
Appendix B. 
Having the unsure response available reduced the proportion of truth responses, but 
not the proportion of lie responses. This is consistent with the informed Cartesian 
hypothesis that the relatively high PTJ is the result of being forced to make a guess when 
unsure. 
Because we were interested in whether people were biased to make truth 
judgements, our dependent variable was the PTJ. However, Gilbert and colleagues used 
accuracy as their dependent variable, which offers a less direct assessment of bias. In the 
online supplement, we reanalyse the data using Gilbert et al.’s procedure. The LT 
condition closely replicates what Gilbert et al. found in their experiment. 
In summary, people are biased towards believing information is true when 
interrupted (LT condition), as is traditionally expected of a Spinozan system – in as much 
                                                                                                                         
lack of biased responding in the unforced LTU condition. Critically, this proposal also 
predicts that no bias will be observed in the forced choice LT condition, a prediction that 
our data soundly disconfirm, and with it, the concern. 
4 A Bayes factor analysis was also conducted because it can give an insight into 
whether null effects are truly inconclusive (e.g., resulting from a lack of power) or 
whether they actually give confirmatory support for the lack of an effect. The analysis 
supports the lack of an effect, and is presented in Appendix A. 
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as it is considered to be a by-product of the architecture. An informed Cartesian should 
also show this bias, for a different reason – it claims that the bias reflects an informed 
guess when unsure. When no longer forced into judgement and able to indicate their 
uncertainty (LTU condition), people were no more likely to believe statements were true 
under cognitive load versus when there was no load. The findings cannot be explained by 
a Spinozan account, but are consistent with the predictions of an informed Cartesian 
account. 
 
 
Figure 1. (a, left) The proportion of truth judgments (PTJ) made by raters in the LT 
forced choice condition. Raters in this condition showed a bias towards believing on 
items that were interrupted (white bars) compared to uninterrupted (grey bars) during 
learning. (b, right) The PTJ made by raters in the LTU unforced choice condition. Raters 
were no more biased towards believing on interrupted compared to uninterrupted items. 
Error bars denote 95% confidence intervals. 
Discussion 
Believing what others say is the unwavering default, according to the Spinozan 
position (Gilbert, 1991; Mandelbaum, 2014; see also Levine, 2014, for a weaker 
defaulting account). Only after assenting belief can people more critically consider 
whether they will continue believing or not. Two lines of research support the account: 
That there is an initial bias towards believing early in the process (a temporal effect), and 
that cognitive load increases the truth bias (an effort effect; Gilbert, 1991; Gilbert et al., 
1990, 1993; Mandelbaum, 2014). Our findings challenge this account. 
The informed Cartesian account was recently forwarded as an alternative (Street & 
Richardson, 2015a). The authors claimed that raters made use of context-relevant 
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knowledge to make the best guess when unsure. They showed that the temporal effect is 
better explained by an informed Cartesian account. Here, we considered whether a 
modified Spinozan account is a viable alternative by examining the effort effect in 
conditions that are favourable to a Spinozan account (Gilbert et al., 1990). We found 
raters were more likely to say they believed a speaker was telling the truth if there was a 
cognitive load, but only if they were forced into making a lie-truth response. Those who 
could explicitly indicate their uncertainty, and no longer needed to guess, did not show 
this bias whether they were under load or not. The findings support an informed 
Cartesian account: When unsure (due to load), the truth bias reflects the best guess when 
required to judge. These findings also dovetail with the predictions of ALIED theory 
(Street, 2015), which claims that people make context-informed guesses under 
uncertainty. 
In recent years, there have been a number of challenges to the Spinozan position. 
For instance, a number of studies show that people can be biased to believe or disbelieve 
early in the judgement and with little effort, depending on prior experience and 
expectations (Deutsch et al., 2009; Hanks, Mazurek, Kiani, Hopp & Schadlen, 2011) and 
the nature of the information available (Hasson et al., 2005; Nadarevic & Erdfelder, 
2013). And yet other studies find support for the Spinozan position (for an up to date 
review, see Mandelbaum, 2014). The current study offers a way to reconcile these 
conflicting streams of research by showing how performance can appear both Spinozan 
and non-Spinozan. Critically, biased performance depends on whether people are forced 
to make a judgement when uncertain. That is, it is not the structure of the mind per se, but 
rather the structure of the world that results in a bias to believe (or disbelieve) (see Street, 
2015). 
What does this mean for the Spinozan account? The account rests largely upon two 
sources of evidence. First, people show a bias to believe when they do not have sufficient 
cognitive resources to move on to the evaluative stage that allows for disbelief. Second, 
people show a bias to believe when under time pressure, and require more time to create 
‘false tags’ and thence disbelieve. Here, we show that the first prediction can be better 
explained by an informed Cartesian account: Cognitive load creates uncertainty and 
results in an attempt to make an informed, albeit biased, guess. The second prediction can 
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also be better explained by an informed Cartesian account – people rely on context to 
make an informed judgement early in the decision process (Street & Richardson, 2015a, 
b). 
A devoted advocate of the Spinozan position may want to move towards claiming 
the account explains only certain limited phenomena.5 For instance, while it may be that 
the Spinozan account cannot explain social judgements (and ignoring for the moment the 
fact that the theory explicitly proposes that the truth bias observed in lie detection studies 
is the result of the Spinozan structure of the mind; Gilbert, 1991; Gilbert et al., 1990, 
1993), it may still explain judgements of written propositions. When proposing the 
Spinozan account, Gilbert et al. (1990) took the position that the Spinozan mind must 
influence belief in its widest form – whether a seemingly deliberative evaluation of belief, 
or an automatic accepting. For example, Gilbert (1991) explains that the visual input 
from our eyes is a form of belief, insomuch as we ‘believe our eyes’. Thus, the Spinozan 
account claims that visual processing is a form of belief. Gilbert (1991) also gave 
considerable space to discussing beliefs that may be considered to be more deliberative, 
including lie detection, the truth bias, and even court sentencing judgements where 
participants were explicitly expected to deliberate on their sentencing (see Gilbert et al., 
1993). In fact, they offered empirical evidence that the truth bias in lie detection tasks is a 
result of the Spinozan mind (Gilbert et al., 1990, Study 2). Evidently, any claims that the 
Spinozan mind does not attempt to explain social judgements such as lie-truth 
judgements are not at all consistent with the empirical evidence or the theory itself (see 
Gilbert, 1991). 
Contracting the account to only explain particular types of belief (e.g., only isolated 
propositions) seriously undermines the account. After all, the account proposes it is the 
structure of the mind, not the nature of the task, that results in an automatic bias to 
believe. If it is just the task set-up that causes the bias, then no strong claims can be made 
to the cognitive structure. It is important, then, that the account can generalize to a variety 
of truth-belief situations, and that the task set-up is not the cause of the bias. 
Yet the task set-up does seem to be the responsible for the truth biases previously 
observed. This undermines the claim that biases are the result of a Spinozan structure of 
                                                
5 An anonymous reviewer of this manuscript took this position. 
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the mind. For instance, that negated propositions (e.g., ‘The star is not above the cross’) 
take longer to process than affirmed propositions (e.g. ‘The star is above the cross’; Clark 
& Chase, 1972; Mayo et al., 2004; Zwaan, Stanfield, & Yaxley, 2002) has been 
considered ‘a theoretical coup for the Spinozan’, and that ‘the quintessential anti-
Cartesian experimental paradigm is one that exploits asymmetries in people’s memory of 
truths and falsehoods’ (Mandelbaum, 2014). But research has shown that this temporal 
effect can be better explained by the greater informativeness of affirmed compared to 
negated propositions (Anderson, Huette, Matlock, & Spivey, 2009; Glenberg & 
Robertson, 1999; Hasson et al., 2005) – even this theoretical coup results from the nature 
of the information available, rather than the architecture of the mind. 
The informed Cartesian and the Spinozan accounts differ not only in the process 
that causes the bias, but also in the conceptualization of the bias itself. The Spinozan 
account views the bias as a fixed constant built into the cognitive system, and as a result, 
it can cause errors in understanding, particularly if the information should not be 
believed. In contrast, the informed Cartesian account views the bias as a flexible 
adaptation to the current context (see Glöckner, Hilbig, & Jekel, 2014; Simon, 1990; 
Street, 2015), as informed by prior experience, and as aiding the judgement rather than 
hindering it (for an overview of generalized heuristic rules improving judgments, see 
Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002). The informed Cartesian 
account is thus highly consistent with the ALIED theory (Street, 2015). 
It is adaptive to believe people are telling the truth because people usually do tell 
the truth (DePaulo et al., 1996; Grice, 1975; McNally & Jackson, 2013). If someone had 
to guess whether a statement was a lie or truth, even before hearing any information, the 
best strategy would be to guess people are being honest (see Nadarevic & Erdfelder, 
2013). But to be truly adaptive, the direction of the bias should reflect the current context, 
such that if the context suggests people are more likely to lie, raters will show a lie bias. 
Making raters suspicious or distrustful increases the likelihood of lie judgements (Mayo 
et al., 2004; Richter et al., 2009; see also Levine et al., 2010; Sperber et al., 2010), and 
when people expect to hear mostly lies, they show a lie bias (Blair, 2006; Masip, Alonso, 
Garrido, & Herrero, 2009; Street & Richardson, 2015b; see also Meissner & Kassin, 
2002). This is consistent with the predictions of ALIED theory (Street, 2015). 
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Before concluding, it is important to discuss the extent to which button responses 
reflect unconscious processes. A Spinozan may argue that even though participants 
indicate uncertainty at a conscious and explicit level, at the unconscious level they are 
still biased towards believing. Put another way, our public measure may not be sensitive 
enough to assess the private cognitive processes at work. 
We have two responses to this. Caution must be heeded when dismissing findings 
based solely on the possibility that what people can be observed to be doing at their 
fingertips is not necessarily a direct reflection of what processing is occurring in the 
cognitive black box. Such a strong critique leaves us in the position of having to dismiss 
the whole body of behavioural psychological research. Of course, the work supporting 
the Spinozan mind account must also be dismissed, because it too is based on behavioural, 
explicit judgements (e.g., Gilbert et al., 1990, 1993). In such a position, we have no 
grounds to support a two-process Spinozan account (an automatic biased process and a 
deliberative unbiased process) over a single-process informed Cartesian account (a 
conscious process that incorporates context). Indeed, in the absence of evidence one 
would imagine that positing an additional process that can neither be controlled by the 
thinker nor measured by the scientist is less parsimonious than claiming that only a single 
measurable process exists (see Street & Vadillo, in press). 
Even if one were to dismiss behavioural data in this way, the current study still 
undermines the Spinozan account. Researchers before us have presented a methodology 
that supposedly evidences unconscious and automatic thinking - namely the use of a 
cognitive load to prevent conscious processing. It is this same method that we used here. 
Our study shows that the responses on this task are guesses when uncertain. Put another 
way, it is not particularly important to us whether the responses we obtained are 
conscious or unconscious. What is important is that in either case, the Spinozan bias 
found by Gilbert et al. (1990) is only evident when the task is set up in a particular way – 
using the forced-choice set-up as devised by Gilbert et al. Evidently, the responses are 
dependent on the structure of the task, not the structure of the mind. At the very least, our 
findings suggest that the evidence so far can be explained by a conscious process, and do 
not require the assumption of an additional hidden and uncontrollable process that leads 
people astray. 
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Conclusion 
The asymmetry in making more truth than lie judgements has been thought to be 
evidence that people are Spinozans. The informed Cartesian account explains how the 
Spinozan mind is only illusory. There have been two major forms of asymmetry evidence 
supporting the Spinozan position. First, there is a bias towards believing rather than 
disbelieving early in the process (a temporal effect; Gilbert et al., 1990, 1993). However, 
this can be better thought of as a best guess when unsure, as proposed by the informed 
Cartesian account (Street & Richardson, 2015a, b). Second, there is a bias towards 
believing when participants are put under a cognitive load (an effort effect; Gilbert et al., 
1990). The current study used a paradigm favourable to the Spinozan account to explore 
the effort effect. We replicated the early bias towards believing if there is a cognitive load, 
but only if participants were forced to make a lie-truth judgement. If they were not forced 
to guess, but could explicitly say they were unsure, there was no such early bias. The 
effort effect can be better explained as a best guess when unsure, as the informed 
Cartesian account proposes. These findings are consistent with the ALIED account of the 
truth bias (Street, 2015). We conclude that people do not have an automatic bias towards 
naïvely believing everything they hear. Rather, they make smart informed guesses when 
they are unsure. 
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Appendix A: Bayes Factor 
Null findings under null hypothesis significance testing do not give positive 
evidence of a lack of an effect, only that an effect (whether present or absent) was not 
observed. It was predicted that there should be a lack of bias in the LTU unforced choice 
condition, placing the hypothesis on the side of the null. To negotiate this issue, a Bayes 
factor was calculated. The Bayes factor pits two competing models against each other 
(e.g., a null and alternative hypothesis). As a result, it can either find (a) positive evidence 
in favor of the null, (b) positive evidence in favor of the alternative, or (c) the data are 
inconclusive, e.g. due to a lack of power. In this way we can ask whether our data show 
evidence of a lack of bias, rather than merely an inconclusive result that may be due to a 
lack of power.6 
The BayesFactor package version 0.9.4 (Morey & Rouder, 2013) designed for R (R 
Development Core, 2011) was used to calculate the Bayes factor. A prior Cauchy 
distribution with a scaling factor of r = √2/2 was used over the standardized effect sizes, 
as recommended by Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey and Iverson (2009; see also Jeffreys, 
1961; Zellner & Siow, 1980).7 
Results 
A Bayes factor was calculated to further examine the lack of bias difference in the 
LTU condition when judging items learnt under cognitive load versus items learnt 
without load. The odds of no difference in bias to there being a difference in bias are 
10.88 to 1. Put another way, in order to prefer the Spinozan interpretation of there being a 
bias difference, we would need prior odds favoring it of greater than 10.88. Thus the data 
show strong support for there being no difference in bias between interrupted and 
uninterrupted items in the LTU condition. 
                                                
6 As a (very) rough guide, Bayes factors between 1 and 3 are generally considered to be 
indicative of a lack of power. However, we caution against using these arbitrary cut-off 
values as a categorical boundary in the way that NHST has adopted p=0.05 as its 
categorical boundary of significance. 
7 This prior also has the advantages of being readily computable and gives a stable 
integration of the likelihood. 
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Appendix B: Three-Way ANOVA on PTJ 
A 2 (response condition: LT or LTU, between subjects) x 2 (speaker veracity: lie or 
truth, within subjects) x 2 (cognitive load: load or no load during learning, within 
subjects) mixed ANOVA was conducted on the PTJ. The critical analyses related to the 
Spinozan and Cartesian accounts are presented in the main body of the text. Here, 
unplanned comparisons for the remaining main effects and interactions are reported. We 
recommend caution in interpreting these unplanned analyses. 
The main effect of interruption was negligible, F (1, 79) = 1.43, p = .236, ηp2 = 0.02. 
The interaction between response condition (LT or LTU) and speaker veracity was also 
of a very small effect size, F (1, 79) = 1.42, p = .236, ηp2 = 0.02, as was the interaction 
between cognitive load and speaker veracity, F (1, 79) = 0.73, p = .396, ηp2 = 0.01. 
Finally, the three-way interaction also had a negligible effect size, F (1, 79) = 0.07, p 
= .787, ηp2 < 0.01. 
 
